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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-2599
___________
ANITA PUTERI SANJATA,
Petitioner
vs.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A79-312-339)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Charles Honeyman
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 8, 2009
Before: FUENTES, WEIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed July 9, 2009)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM.
Anita Puteri Sanjata (“Sanjata”), an ethnic-Chinese Christian, is a native
and citizen of Indonesia. She entered the United States in October 1998 on a visitor’s
visa with authorization to remain until April 22, 1999. Sanjata overstayed her visa and
filed an administrative application for asylum in May 2001, which was denied. The
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Government charged her with removability for overstaying her visa. Before the IJ,
Sanjata conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 She also requested voluntary departure.
I
In her asylum application, Sanjata explained that she had experienced
mistreatment in Indonesia based on her religion and ethnicity. Throughout her childhood,
Muslim Indonesians shouted ethnic slurs at her in public. At the age of 13, when Sanjata
was waiting for her parents after school, a teenager on a bicycle approached her and
forcibly grabbed her breast, shouting an ethnic slur as he rode away. Men nearby laughed
and offered her no help. She testified that she and her friend fled the scene because they
worried that the “native guys laughing at us would harass us[,] too.” A.R. 247.
While in high school, a gang of children attacked Sanjata’s brother and
stole his necklace. When their mother contacted the police, she was rebuffed because of
her ethnicity.
Later, Sanjata and her boyfriend were involved in a minor car accident.
When her boyfriend attempted to assist the other driver, a mob of Muslim Indonesians,
including the other driver, assaulted the boyfriend and relented only when he gave them

1

The asylum application Sanjata filed with the IJ differed substantially from her
administrative application. Sanjata initially filed for asylum in May 2001 with the
assistance of an entity later charged with submitting fraudulent claims. However, Sanjata
demonstrated to the satisfaction of the IJ that she was not complicit in any fraudulent
filing and he permitted her to file a new asylum application. Our review, like the
agency’s, considers the claims raised in her second application, not the first.
2

money. They did not report the incident because they feared that the police would not
help.
Following a soccer game, Sanjata, who was driving with her mother,
witnessed angry Indonesians attacking ethnic-Chinese people. However, Sanjata and her
mother escaped without incident.
On another occasion, Sanjata was injured in a motorcycle accident. She and
her family went to the police the next day to reclaim the motorcycle. The police
improperly charged Sanjata’s mother money to file a report. They never heard from the
police about the matter again.
Finally, Sanjata was in Jakarta when anti-Sino-Christian riots broke out in
1998. Although she escaped to the airport and never encountered any violence, she
witnessed the chaos as her plane departed Jakarta. She left for the United States soon
after.
The Immigration Judge denied Sanjata’s application, reasoning that her
asylum application was time-barred and, alternatively, without merit. Although he found
her testimony credible, the IJ reasoned that the incidents Sanjata described did not rise to
the level of persecution, either individually or cumulatively. He also concluded that she
failed to demonstrate a likelihood that she would be singled out for persecution if she
returned to Indonesia, or that a pattern or practice of persecution against Chinese
Christians exists there. The IJ also denied Sanjata’s request for withholding and CAT
protection, but granted her request for voluntary departure. The BIA affirmed for
3

substantially the reasons given by the IJ. Sanjata presents a petition for review.
II
We have jurisdiction over Sanjata’s petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).
Because the BIA issued its own opinion, we review its decision rather than that of the IJ.
See Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005). However, we review the decision
of the IJ to the extent that the BIA defers to or adopts the IJ’s reasoning. See Chavarria v.
Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006). We review agency factual determinations
for substantial evidence, and will uphold such determinations “unless the evidence not
only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.” Zhang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 150,
155 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). We review legal questions de novo,
subject to established principles of deference. See Cospito v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 166,
171 (3d Cir. 2008).
Petitioner raises only two cognizable arguments on appeal: 1) she
demonstrated eligibility for withholding of removal based on events which, viewed
cumulatively, amount to past persecution, and 2) she demonstrated eligibility for
withholding of removal based on a pattern or practice of persecution against Chinese or
Christians in Indonesia.2 We address each argument in turn.

2

Sanjata raises other arguments in her brief and reply brief that we do not consider
because the claims were not exhausted in agency proceedings, including whether the
"organized, systemic or pervasive" standard is a disjunctive test that could be satisfied by
any one of its elements. See Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 447 (3d Cir. 2005).
We also note that Sanjata does not raise any claims related to the agency determination
that her asylum application was untimely. Even if she did, we lack jurisdiction to
4

“The threshold for establishing eligibility for withholding of removal is
higher than that for establishing entitlement to asylum and requires the alien to
demonstrate a ‘clear probability’ that, upon removal to the country of origin, his or her
‘life or freedom would be threatened on account of one of the statutorily enumerated
factors.’” Obale v. Att’y Gen., 453 F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Senathirajah v.
INS, 157 F.3d 210, 215 (3d Cir. 1998)). The clear probability standard is met if the
petitioner shows that it is more likely than not that she will suffer persecution. See Miah
v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 434, 439 (3d Cir. 2003). Persecution includes “threats to life,
confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to
life or freedom.” Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993). However, it “does not
encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or
unconstitutional.” Id.
Sanjata argues that the BIA erred in its determination that the incidents she
experienced in Indonesia, when viewed cumulatively, do not amount to persecution. The
incidents Sanjata experienced are indeed troubling, but it is not clear that they amount to
the conduct described in Fatin. We cannot say that the record compels disagreement with
the BIA’s analysis. See Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2007).
Alternatively, an alien may satisfy the clear probability standard by
demonstrating a genuinely held subjective fear of persecution and the existence of a

entertain such claims. See Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2003)
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“‘pattern or practice in his or her country of nationality . . . of persecution of a group of
persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .’” Sukwanputra v.
Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 637 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A)). In
that regard, Sanjata argues that the BIA incorrectly determined that no pattern or practice
of persecution against Chinese Christians exists in Indonesia. Notwithstanding the
evidence presented by Sanjata of the lower status endured by Chinese Christians in
Indonesia, we agree with the Government that the 2005 and 2006 U.S. State Department
Country Reports relied on by the IJ and BIA do not demonstrate a pattern or practice of
persecution. Indeed, recent cases from this Circuit indicate a trend toward better
treatment for Chinese Christians. See, e.g., Sioe Tjen Wong v. Att’y General, 539 F.3d
225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that State Department reports from 2005 to 2007
describe better conditions for Chinese Christians in Indonesia). As such, Sanjata’s
argument lacks merit.
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.

6

